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CALIFORNIA DREAMING? 
DARREN ROSENBLUM* 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past few years, California became the setting for shocking tales of 
sex inequality and abuse in Hollywood and Silicon Valley. Decades after women 
achieved educational parity,1 men still run the corporate world. In response to 
these stories exposed by the #MeToo movement, California joined the 
transnational corporate board quota movement by converting its voluntary 
quota into a hard one. Will California’s first mover status overcome 
constitutional objections and inspire other jurisdictions to act. Or is just utopian 
dreaming, California-style? This Essay argues that despite its many flaws, the 
quota may succeed in curbing male over-representation on corporate boards. 
After contextualizes the quota within the transnational corporate board quota 
movement, it rejects the U.S. reaction that emphasizes the private sector’s 
dominion over equality remedies. Despite the U.S. resistance to quotas, 
comparative experience reveals both that the private sector manages how quota 
implementation occurs. The Essay concludes that some public intervention—in 
concert with private efforts—remains necessary.  
  
 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. Thanks to Jill Fisch for her 
encouragement and to her and Yaron Nili for their comments. Thanks also to Lucas Mathieu 
and Brian Looser for their research support.  
1 See Alana Samuels, Poor Girls Are Leaving Their Brothers, ATLANTIC (Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/11/gender-education-gap/546677/.  
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INTRODUCTION 
California, when confronted with the shocking sex inequality in Hollywood 
and Silicon Valley exposed by the #MeToo movement, followed the 
transnational corporate board quota movement by converting its voluntary quota 
into a hard quota. This Essay recounts the reactions to the quota and evaluates 
them against some comparative experiences.  
In 2003, Norway passed the first corporate board quota.2 France followed suit 
in 2011, paving the way for other leading economies.3  Now six of the world’s 
top ten economies have a quota.4  
 Here in the United States, California became a battleground of sex equality 
efforts. In 2013, California adopted a voluntary corporate board quota.5 The five 
years that followed saw growing controversies over women’s place in the state’s 
private sector leadership. Twitter’s 2013 initial public offering (“IPO”) was 
marred by the initially proposed all-male board.6 Google, Uber, and other firms 
faced sex inequality and sexual harassment controversies that exposed 
significant governance oversights related to sex.7 In 2018, #MeToo erupted, 
leaving Hollywood and the corporate sector looking woefully unprepared.8 
 
2 See Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6.1 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 55, 62-63 (2009). 
3 See Loi 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative à la représentation équilibrée des femmes 
et des hommes au sein des conseils d’administration et de surveillance et à l’égalité 
professionnelle [Law 2011-103 of January 27, 2011 on the Balanced Representation of 
Women and Men on Board of Directors and Supervisory Boards and Equality Professional], 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 
28, 2011, p. 1680; Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, More Than a Woman: Insights 
Into Corporate Governance After the French Sex Quota, 48 IND. L. REV. 889, 889 (2015). 
4 Simona Comi et al., Quotas Have Led to More Women on Corporate Boards in Europe, 
LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI.: BUS. REV. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/business 
review/2016/09/30/quotas-have-led-to-more-women-on-corporate-boards-in-europe/ 
[https://perma.cc/W8DJ-WCSM] (explaining gender quota systems implemented in Germany 
and Italy); Institutional S’holder Servs., Inc., Gender Parity on Boards Around the World, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 5, 2017), https://corpgov.law.har 
vard.edu/2017/01/05/gender-parity-on-boards-around-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/LJT5-UL 
HP] (detailing gender quota systems in Canada, France, India, and the United Kingdom). 
5 See S. Concurrent Res. 62, ch. 125, 2013 Leg., 2013-2014 Sess. (Cal. 2013).  
6 Vauhini Vara, Why One Female Board Member Is Not Enough, NEW YORKER (Dec. 5, 
2013), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-one-female-board-member-isnt-
enough.  
7 Jena McGregor, Tech Firms Reckon with the Long Tail of #MeToo, Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 
2018, at G01.  
8 See Sandra Gonzalez, Lisa Respers France & Chloe Melas, The Year Since the Weinstein 
Scandal First Rocked Hollywood, CNN (Oct. 4, 2018, 5:47 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/ 
04/05/entertainment/weinstein-timeline/index.html [https://perma.cc/5EJA-Z7FK]; see also 
Cara Buckley, 300 Strong: Hollywood Women United to Fight Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
2, 2018, at C1; Sheelah Kolhatkar, The Tech Industry’s Gender-Discrimination Problem, 
NEW YORKER, Nov. 20, 2017, at 52. 
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Although CalPERS—the state’s gargantuan pension fund—leads on 
inclusion, it is no surprise then that legislators acted, since California often is the 
first mover.9 Thus, fifteen years after Norway, quotas finally made it to the 
United States when California adopted a hard quota.10   
It was inevitable that the controversy around affirmative action would 
dominate the debate over the quota. The low regard for California’s overall 
corporate law did not help inspire respect for the quota, which has attracted 
broad and deep criticism.11 
The quota’s urgency persists despite widespread opprobrium, as a subsequent 
2018 event demonstrated. The fracas over Brett Kavanaugh’s nomination to the 
U.S. Supreme Court saw eleven men of the Senate Judiciary Committee confront 
the challenge of having to interview a woman.12 The fact that they hired another 
woman to do the job for them proves that all-male leadership no longer seems 
legitimate, even for the most conservative among us.  
But this is no mere question of appearances: men hold approximately 80% of 
corporate board positions and 95% of CEO positions.13 More men named James 
 
9 See Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from 
CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227, 230-31 (1996) Diversity & Inclusion, CALPERS, https://www.calp 
ers.ca.gov/page/investments/investment-manager-engagement-programs/diversity-inclusion 
[https://perma.cc/KR6X-W5B9] (last updated Feb. 26, 2019); see also David A. Katz & Laura 
A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update: Shareholder Activism Is the Next Phase of 
#MeToo, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. 
REG. (Sept. 28, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/28/corporate-governance-
update-shareholder-activism-is-the-next-phase-of-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/639P-ZE9B]. 
10 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 (West 2019); Rosenblum, supra note 2, at 62-63.  
11 See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Mandating Gender Diversity in the Corporate 
Boardroom: The Inevitable Failure of California’s SB 826, at 1 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. 
Governance, Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No. 232, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3248791 [https://perma.cc/WHM6-YLBP] (arguing that California’s 
gender quota law is unconstitutional, unlikely to achieve its objective of more diverse 
corporate boards, and likely to hurt affirmative action jurisprudence). 
12 See James Poniewozik, Two Voices with a Notable Contrast in Volume, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 28, 2018, at A16. 
13 HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, ROUTE TO THE TOP 2018, at 2 (2018), 
https://www.heidrick.com/Knowledge-Center/Publication/Route_to_the_Top_2018 
(explaining that, based on an examination of twelve to thirteen countries in Western Europe 
and the United States, 95% of CEOs are male); Stacy Jones, White Men Account for 72% of 
Corporate Leadership at 16 of the Fortune 500 Companies, FORTUNE (June 9, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/06/09/white-men-senior-executives-fortune-500-companies-
diversity-data/ [https://perma.cc/7U76-DTRR] (stating that, based on an examination of 
sixteen of the top Fortune 500 companies, 79.5% of senior management are male). 
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hold CEO positions than all women combined.14 Decades after women achieved 
educational parity,15 men still run the corporate world. Enter quotas. 
What remains to be seen is whether, like Norway in Europe, California’s first 
mover status will overcome constitutional objections and inspire other 
jurisdictions to act. Or is just utopian dreaming, California-style? This Essay 
argues that despite its many flaws, the quota may succeed in curbing male over-
representation on corporate boards. Part I first contextualizes the quota within 
the transnational corporate board quota movement. Part II considers the U.S. 
reaction—a spate of critiques that question the use of public remedies. Given 
experience abroad, Part III argues that there is a symbiotic relationship between 
the public and private sectors. The Essay concludes that some public 
intervention—in concert with private efforts—remains necessary. 
I. CALIFORNIA’S STATUTE SET AGAINST THE INTERNATIONAL QUOTA 
MOVEMENT 
On September 30, 2018, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law the 
quota, which requires any publicly traded firm with a principal office in 
California to include women on their boards.16 The quota, built on a 2013 
voluntary quota, establishes a weak requirement for 2019 of one woman on each 
board, and a much stronger, almost parity, requirement for the end of 2021.17 
A. The Quota’s Fine Print 
The 2019 one-woman requirement18 mirrors what became a widespread norm 
in the middle of this decade after Twitter released its IPO plans. They included 
an all-male board, which aroused widespread criticism.19 Concerned that this 
response would mar the sale price of the stock, management quickly revamped 
 
14 Claire Cain Miller, Kevin Quealy & Margot Sanger-Katz, Women are Often 
Outnumbered by Men Named John in Top Corporate Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2018, at F10. 
15 See Alana Samuels, Poor Girls Are Leaving Their Brothers, ATLANTIC (Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/11/gender-education-gap/546677/.  
16 See Patrick McGreevy, Brown Signs Bill to Battle Corporate Gender Gap, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 1, 2018, at A2. 
17 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 (West 2019) (“No later than the close of the 2021 calendar 
year, a publcly held . . . corporation shall comply with the following: (1) If its number of 
directors is six or more, the coporation shall have a minimum of three female directors. (2) If 
its number of directors is five, the corporation shall have a minimum of two female directors. 
(3) If its number of directors is four or fewer, the corporation shall have a minimum of one 
female director.”). 
18 Id. § 301.3(a). 
19 Bronwen Clune, There’s Absolutely No Excuse for Twitter Not to Have a Woman on Its 
Board, GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2013, 12:42 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2013/oct/11/twitter-ipo-women-board; Nilofer Merchant, Viewpoint: Twitter’s All-Male 
Board Spells Failure, TIME (Oct. 07, 2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/10/07/viewpoint-
twitters-all-male-board-spells-failure/. 
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the board to include a woman.20 After that incident, many boards began to add 
at least one female member.21  
California’s short-term requirement of one woman per board also echoes 
India’s 2013 quota.22 Over 75% of California firms already comply with this 
rule, so it was a mandate that imposed little on relatively few firms. One study 
showed that 82% of firms with over $5 million in revenue meet this basic 
criterion.23 It is a credit to CalPERS and other activist investors that firms have 
already diversified to this basic level.24 
The 2021 requirement places at least two women on boards of five and three 
women on boards of six or more.25 This near parity requirement diminishes as 
boards grow larger. A twelve member board’s mandate is only one quarter 
women.26 It is a novel structure but one that may arouse discontent among firms 
with smaller boards whose compliance standards will prove relatively more 
onerous as compared to firms with larger boards. 
This next stage of enforcement will prove challenging—currently 79% of 
firms would be noncompliant.27 Compliance will come more easily to larger 
firms with the means to perform broader searches.28 Will some try to avoid 
enforcement? As Part III explores, several techniques surface to accomplish 
this—firms may decide just to pay the fines, though substantial for smaller firms. 
Firms may choose to alter their domicile, although that seems like an extreme 
response.29 Firms may change the size of their boards. They may even, as a last 
option, include “token” women to comply. 
 
20 Jessica Guynn, Twitter Adds First Female Board Member, ex-Pearson CEO—
#abouttime, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013, 9:16 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/ 
technology/la-fi-tn-twitter-adds-first-female-board-member-20131205-story.html. 
21 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
22 See Afra Afsharipour, The One Woman Director Mandate: History and Trajectory, in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INDIA: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 85, 85-86 (Asish K. 
Bhattacharyya ed., 2016). 
23 Thomas Pereira, Equilar, Inc., Gender Quotas in California Boardrooms, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2018/08/29/gender-quotas-in-california-boardrooms/ [https://perma.cc/FG4R-L5LC]. 
24 See Howard Dicker, Lyuba Goltser & Erika Kaneko, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 
Mandated Gender Diversity for California Boards, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (Oct. 18, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/18/mandated-gender-
diversity-for-california-boards/ [https://perma.cc/JGV5-LN3C] (acknowledging actions of 
BlackRock, Glass Lewis, Institutional Shareholder Services, and State Street). 
25 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(b) (West 2019). 
26 See id. (requiring minimum of three women on boards for any company with six or more 
board members). 
27 Pereira, supra note 23.   
28 Interview with 17F, in Paris, France. 
29 Interview with 19F, in Paris, France (stating that adding women to the board is a “minor 
issue” and would not merit an “overly complex” response). 
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For noncompliance, though, California imposes fines rather than the 
existential penalties common in Europe.30 The Secretary of State will perform a 
manual review to ascertain compliance.31 Fines of $100,000 will accrue for firms 
with one violation, and a second will garner a $300,000 fine.32 While these strict 
fines may inspire compliance, they could also disproportionately punish smaller 
firms. 
B. Comparing California’s Quota to Quotas Abroad 
U.S observers of quotas occasionally have a parochial reaction to quotas, 
which are now so well-established abroad. Over one hundred countries have 
political quotas.33 Six of the top ten economies have corporate board quotas, not 
to mention most of Europe.34 Most copy two elements of Norway’s statute.35 
Several mirror the existential penalty framework (in Norway, dissolution), and 
they also set a sex balance percentage target for boards.36 
Firms complied on the whole when faced with these mandates. They complied 
even though they possessed (albeit challenging) options to avoid the mandate. It 
is a seachange—now women constitute a plurality on most European countries’ 
corporate boards, and these firms consistently lead in inclusion. 
Among the range of quota remedies, at the top sit requirements such as those 
adopted by France, Norway, and others.37 These fixed and governmentally 
regulated measures carry greater weight as firms labor to avoid draconian, even 
existential, penalties. Below are firm quotas with minor impositions, such as 
India’s one woman rule38 or jurisdictions that impose financial penalties, such 
as California. Below that sits a range of still softer public remedies, including 
 
30 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(e); see Pereira, supra note 23. 
31 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(c); see Dicker, Goltser & Kaneko, supra note 24. 
32 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(e). 
33 See Gender Quotas Database, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, 
https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-overview 
[https://perma.cc/4KYE-9RYG] (last visited Apr. 19, 2019). 
34 See id. 
35 See, e.g., Nicola Clark, Getting Women Into Boardrooms, by Law, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/world/europe/28iht-quota.html (explaining 
provisions of the Norwegian gender quota statute). 
36 Gwladys Fouché, Quarter of Norway’s Firms Face Shutdown as Female Directors 
Deadline Approaches, GUARDIAN (Dec. 27, 2007, 6:44 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
business/2007/dec/27/norway.female.director. 
37 Andrew Osborn, Norway Sets 40% Female Quota for Boardrooms, GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 
2002, 3:46 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2002/aug/01/publicsectorcareers.ge 
nderissues [https://perma.cc/9L4L-K8T6].  
38 Afsharipour, supra note 22, at 85. 
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the comply-or-explain model used in the United Kingdom,39 Canada,40 and the 
United States’s much-criticized optional reporting regime. Private remedies fall 
at the bottom of the spectrum, as they seek to inspire rather than mandate 
progress. 
 
Figure 1. Corporate Diversity Remedies. 
 
 
 
On this spectrum, the California quota fits just below the strongest quotas for 
two reasons—its imposition diminishes for larger boards and the penalties are 
monetary. California was not the first to adopt (even if only temporarily) a one-
woman rule, as India continues to impose this requirement.41  
In contrast to the other quotas, four elements stand out for California’s quota.  
First, it seems an outlier among other common law jurisdictions such as Canada 
and the United Kingdom, both of which have comply-or-explain models.42 
These requirements engage in much softer pressure on firms by setting a thirty 
percent target and obligating firms to explain if they fail to meet that number.43 
 
39 FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 9 (2018), 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-
Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7G5-UFQD] (explaining United 
Kingdom’s comply-or-explain model). 
40 AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY 247-48 (2016); see 
Alexandra Bosanac, Gender-Equity “Comply or Explain” Rules for Boards Are Working—
Sort Of, CANADIAN BUS. (Jun. 18, 2015), https://www.canadianbusiness.com/innovation/osc-
comply-and-explain-boards-torys-study/ [https://perma.cc/GV6U-5HZA] (detailing 
Canada’s comply-or-explain model and its consequences since taking effect). 
41 Afsharipour, supra note 22, at 85. 
42 DHIR, supra note 40, at 247-48. 
43 Id. at 240. 
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These requirements prove surprisingly effective thanks to rigorous disclosure 
requirements. 
These foreign quotas each reflect a distinct relationship between the state and 
the market. Even with the most dirigiste of quotas—the Norwegian and French 
quotas—it is the firms themselves which determine how to implement the quota. 
The other common law countries with quotas—the United Kingdom and 
Canada—both follow the comply-or-explain model. This model defers much 
more to firms in whether and how they implement the quota norm. Their 
flexibilty may provide more potential for public-private synergy than the hard 
fines imposed by the California law. Its firm mandate fits awkwardly in a 
common law system in which the state often  encourages good governance rather 
than impose it. 
Second, California’s quota draws on critial mass research in a novel fashion. 
Critical mass—the percentage of a minority necessary for it to have a voice in 
governance44—arises from Professor Rosabeth Moss Kanter, who argued that 
one needs a third or three members of a minority out of a group of ten to allow 
the minority a voice.45 Drawing on this work, Norway mandated a 40% floor for 
either sex, followed by France and others.46 The Canadian, German, and U.K. 
rules focus on 30%.47 Both numbers approximate the critical mass measurement. 
Minimal representation may prove token, leaving the minority voiceless. 
The California quota effectively decreases as boards get beyond six members. 
Typically larger firms have larger boards.48 In effect, California chose to hold 
smaller firms to higher compliance. It is an unusual policy choice for a state that 
 
44 See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex 
Ratios and Responses to Token Women, 82 AM. J. SOC. 965, 966, 968 (1977); see also 
DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW 
KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM 110 (2007) (explaining how tokenism and skewed 
groups cause “women and other minorities to rise no higher than an intermediate management 
level”). 
45 Kanter, supra note 44, at 988. 
46 Osborn, supra note 37.  
47 See Alison Smale & Claire Cain Miller, Germany Sets Gender Quota in Boardrooms, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2015, at A1 (detailing Germany’s 30% female quota); see also The 
Canadian Press, OSC Urged to Push Companies to Set Targets for Women on Boards, CBC 
(Oct. 24, 2017, 3:00 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/women-boards-osc-1.4369447 
[https://perma.cc/E77U-XHTH] (detailing the Ontario Securities Commission’s desired target 
for female board representation); Sarah Gordon, UK plc Behind Target Number of Women on 
Boards, FIN. TIMES (Jun. 27, 3018), https://www.ft.com/content/ac1449b8-79f7-11e8-bc55-
50daf11b720d (detailing the U.K. Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy’s 
endorsement of a 30% target of female representation on corporate boards). 
48 See, e.g., Troy Segal, Evaluating the Board of Directors, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.in 
vestopedia.com/articles/analyst/03/111903.asp [https://perma.cc/KN3S-2T2F] (last updated 
Apr. 19, 2018) (explaining breakdown of corporate executive boards and why larger firms 
require more committees, like nominating or governance committees, which require more 
board members). 
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holds itself out as encouraging innovation. One justification is that that a 
proportional requirement for smaller boards may yield only token 
representation. Critiques of this model surfaced around India’s quota which 
required only one woman board member, and have arisen in the extensive 
literature around Black political representation in the U.S.. It was in that context 
that scholars first realized that token inclusion would add relatively little to 
decision-making in deliberative bodies.49 
Third, the most significant divergence is that California gives firms far less 
time to implement the quota than other countries did. Both Norway and France 
instituted six-year periods50—a substantial amount of time for firms to ramp up 
broader searches using new methods to find diverse board members. Firms 
shifted from identifying board members through personal networks to using 
executive search firms, and civil society had time to organize programs to train 
women for these positions.51 This longer delay allowed firms time to accustom 
themselves to the new reality. By contrast, California allowed its firms half that 
time for some of them to achieve even more substantial levels of inclusion.52 
Last, California’s requirement is unusually sex-specific. The French and 
Norwegian quotas, and those that copy the model, set a goal of balance in which 
there’s a forty percent floor for either sex.53 Here I should note that quota 
implementation reinforces the sex binary, even as it attacks sex inequality over 
the long term. This element instituted sex-neutrality for constitutionality 
purposes in which both sexes avoid any substantial under (or over) 
representation.54 This balance model skirts the binary by allowing firms more 
flexiblity. 
California’s quota uniquely melds elements, such as the one-woman rule, with 
novel obligations, such as the three-woman floor for firms. California’s quota 
 
49 Afsharipour, supra note 14, at 87. See generally Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, 
89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991). 
50 See Daniel Flynn, France Sets Quota for Women on Big Companies’ Boards, REUTERS 
(Jan. 13, 2011, 3:48 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-equality/france-sets-
quota-for-women-on-big-companies-boards-idUSTRE70C5ZA20110113 [https://perma.cc/ 
H6AD-BQ2B]. 
51 Cathrine Seierstad, Morten Huse & Silvija Seres, Lessons from Norway in Getting 
Women onto Corporate Boards, CONVERSATION (Mar. 6, 2015, 9:44 AM), https://theconve 
rsation.com/lessons-from-norway-in-getting-women-onto-corporate-boards-38338 
[https://perma.cc/3UA7-HDY3].  
52 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 (West 2019). 
53 See generally Darren Rosenblum, Loving Gender Balance: Reframing Identity-Based 
Inequality Remedies, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873 (2008) (applying past remedies of racially 
based inequality to current corporate gender-based inequalities that exist today, which have 
each been subjects of debate for decades, and comparing how different countries have utilized 
different methods in order to remedy gender disparity that exists in the economic sector, each 
of which with the goal of attaining harmonious gender balance). 
54 Institutional S’holder Servs., Inc., supra note 4. 
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resembles those of Norway or France, and in many ways it resembles quotas in 
civil law countries most. However, California’s use of fines instead of existential 
penalties reflects a more market-oriented framework.  
The peculiarities of California’s quota invite criticism, some of it merited. 
The response has been a clash between rising transnational equality norms and 
the U.S. opponents’ deep resistance to the very idea of a mandatory remedy for 
inequality. 
II. QUOTA CRITIQUES 
Unsurprisingly, the introduction of a state-driven equality mandate aroused a 
sharp response in the United States.55 Beyond the bridling over identitarianism, 
critics argued that the private sector alone can fix sex inequality. The private 
sector has made advances, it is true, most notably with the rise of shareholder 
activism for social justice.56 But these efforts still come up short, which explains 
why California legislated in the first place.57 This Part outlines the critiques of 
the quota, most notably the argument that private sector pressure can best attack 
inequality.  
A. Broader Arguments 
Even since late September 2018, the quota garnered substantial opposition.58 
All admit the necessity of diversity, but resist any state mandate.59 The lack of 
 
55 See, Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity: Electoral Gender Inequality on the Tightrope 
of Liberal Constitutional Traditions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119, 1133-35, 1165-83 (2006) 
(exploring U.S. resistance to quotas as a remedy for inequality). 
56 See DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST 
BEST WEAPON 134 (2018). 
57 See Unfinished Business on CA S.B.826 Before the S. Floor, 2018 Leg., 2017-2018 Sess. 
(Cal. 2018). 
58 See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 11, at 1-2. 
59 See John M. Conley, Lissa L. Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Narratives of Diversity 
in the Corporate Boardroom: What Corporate Insiders Say About Why Diversity Matters, in 
DISCOURSE PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION 175, 188-89 (Jolana Aritz & 
Robyn C. Walker eds., 2010) (describing extensive study of U.S. corporate board members 
on diversity). Professors Conley, Broome, and Krawiec’s study revealed a paradox: 
interviewees nearly universally lauded diversity, stating its central importance to good 
governance, and often noting the material benefits to the firm. Yet when pressed as to the 
specifics of diversity, interviewees were equally universal in their vagueness. Id. They loved 
the idea of diversity but did not have any specific sense of what it would do or why it was 
important. Id.; see also Lissa L. Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Dangerous 
Categories: Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 805 (2011). It 
seems the response to the quota matches this research quite closely. See Ilya Somin, 
California’s Unconstitutional Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Oct. 4, 2018, 3:58 PM), https://reason.com/2018/10/04/californias-unconstitutional-gender-
quot [https://perma.cc/6H6S-5CJR] (arguing that general interest of diversity does not justify 
gender quotas). 
 
  
1446 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1435 
 
women on boards, commentators generally agree, is wrong as a normative 
matter and harms California’s economy. In introducing the bill, Senator Jackson 
noted that 52% of the state’s population is represented by only 15% of directors 
on public corporations’ boards,60 below the national average.61 
The broadest argument made against the quota is that it fails constitutional 
equality norms, by disfavoring men.62 Challenges to the quota’s constitutionality 
may impede implementation of the quota, but I leave that analysis to 
constitutional scholars. California seems determined to advance a remedy, 
regardless of the shape the quota takes—if this quota is struck down, another 
perhaps softer one, may take its place. The will to adapt the quota to 
constitutional norms depends on the political currency and policy analysis. 
Comparative knowledge clarifies what we may expect.  
Critics suggest the quota sets California down a slippery slope toward racial 
quotas.63 Others argue that the quota’s overreaching puts at risk other affirmative 
action programs.64 Similiarly, but from an opposing normative stance, others 
criticize the bill because it elevates sex above other types of diversity as a basis 
for remedy.65 
Some have argued that the quota’s effect will be limited because of the 
restrictions imposed by other states that California law can only govern 
corporations incorporated there.66 This internal affairs doctrine, if correct, would 
substantially limit the applicability of the quota to businesses in California, 
because most corporations headquartered in California are chartered 
elsewhere.67 
Tokenism, a related argument, is often lodged against positive or affirmative 
action. The quota introduces tokenism that serves to stigmatize those it purports 
 
60 See Patrick McGreevy, California Lawmakers Approve Bill to Require Corporate 
Boards to Include Women, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018, 12:24 PM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-may-2018-california-lawmakers-approve-bill-
to-1535656445-htmlstory.html. 
61 See Valerie Richardson, California Bill Mandating Gender Quotas for Corporate 
Boards Heads to Governor, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.washington 
times.com/news/2018/aug/31/california-bill-mandating-gender-quotas-corporate-/ 
(“Supporters of the bills argued that California boards are less diverse than those in other 
states. About 15.6 percent of board seats in the state’s publicly traded corporations are held 
by women, versus 16.2 percent nationwide.”). 
62 See, e.g., Somin, supra note 59. 
63 See Jeff Jacoby, California’s Latest Bad Idea: Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards, 
BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 15, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/09/15/california-
latest-bad-idea-gender-quotas-for-corporate-
boards/N2nOYGvqwRkLszi4a5mySK/story.html. 
64 See Grundfest, supra note 11, at 6. 
65 See Richardson, supra note 61. 
66 See Grundfest, supra note 11, at 3-4.  
67 See id.  
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to benefit, it is argued. Firms will place women on boards because they are 
women rather than because they are qualified.  
One Republican Senator argued, “I can’t support a bill that underestimates the 
power and strength of women.”68 He went further: “To say that they can’t find 
their way onto a board without our help undermines all their hard work.”69 A 
business leader echoed these concerns: Lucy Dunn, President and CEO of the 
Orange County Business Council, stated: “This legislation is, to me, 
insulting. . . . Rather than celebrate the competitive advantage women bring to 
positions of leadership in a company, it relegates them to placeholder status.”70 
 Another argument, though, holds more real weight. The quota violates a 
presumption that the state will stay out of corporate affairs. This norm proves 
central to corporate governance and the law surrounding it as canonized in the 
business judgment rule.71 Former Netflix executive Patty McCord argued that 
“[i]t’s tough to have the government make decisions for us in terms of the ways 
we run our businesses, and I personally would prefer that we not have the 
legislation and that the right thing happens anyway.”72 
Forcing quotas, they seem to argue, will only slow this process by taking away 
the legitimacy of those women who do find themselves chosen to serve on 
boards. This total faith in the market to resolve inequality resides in a complete 
suspicion of government legislation. This position places trust in wisdom of the 
market as it presents quotas, as intrusive, destructive, and sexist. 
B. Will Private Efforts Prove More Effective? 
U.S. emphasis on autonomy and limited regulation, along with a deep 
skepticism about the state, drives an exclusive focus on the power of the private 
sector. This broader phenomenon runs even deeper in the corporate context, 
where even courts themselves admit they should almost always refrain from 
second-guessing business judgments. Outside of fundamental duties, nearly 
everything comes down to firm discretion.73  
Broader phenomena support this notion of firm autonomy. Professor David 
Webber powerfully argues that labor’s strongest tool in a time of re-
intrenchment is their shareholder power.74 Public retirement funds are some of 
the largest investors in the United States, and their support for stakeholders could 
 
68 McGreevy, supra note 60. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 See Business Judgment Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
72 Jorge L. Ortiz, Gender Quotas: California Ponders Breakthrough Bill to Boost Female 
Executives, USA TODAY (Sept. 18, 2018, 3:20 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
2018/09/18/gender-quotas-california-corporate-boards/1339531002/. 
73 Business Judgment Rule, supra note 71. 
74 See generally WEBBER, supra note 56. 
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prove central to shifting corporate norms.75 Firms can and do institute greater 
equality within their organizations, but many only change when the shareholders 
that elect their boards insist on that change. Shareholders do, after all, elect the 
board. Institutional shareholders, such as public retirement funds, hold the power 
to pressure firms to improve sex equality at the board level. 
Webber correctly urges institutional investors—in particular union retirement 
funds—to stand up for the norms of their funders: workers. David Webber 
authoritatively delineates the potential here.76 These institutional investors can 
and should steer firms toward stakeholder-driven decisionmaking. Whether that 
institutional shareholder is BlackRock77 or CalPERS,78 sex equality fits squarely 
within this mission.  
I agree wholeheartedly with Webber here about the potential for institutional 
shareholder activism. The private sector does offer an incredible opportunity, so 
clearly demonstrated in Webber’s recent book.79 The money and power to 
support progressive change can yield greater inclusion of women. Some social 
change can come from the private sector—the plethora of consumer boycotts 
evidence this form of activism.80 In the U.S. context, it goes without question 
that private efforts play a central role. Whether from a market efficiency or a 
social justice framing, the emphasis on private remedies draws on long-
established—and criticized—understandings of discrimination. 
Many of these arguments rely on Gary Becker’s assertion that discrimination 
is inefficient.81 Nondiscriminatory firms can snap up underpaid people subject 
to discrimination and profit from their skills. Other market actors will witness 
this profitability and over time, will drive the market to eliminate 
discrimination.82 For nearly a half century, Becker’s theory has impeded efforts 
to limit public efforts by arguing that the private sector can and will fix 
inequality.83  
 
75 Id. at 8-10. 
76 See generally WEBBER, supra note 56. 
77 See Emily Winston, Benevolent Blackrock and the Limitations of Shareholder Power 
(Oct. 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=3219871. 
78 See WEBBER, supra note 56, at 9-14. 
79 Id.  
80 See Boycotts List, ETHICAL CONSUMER, https://www.ethicalconsumer.org/ethical 
campaigns/boycotts [https://perma.cc/9WVJ-LEA4] (last visited Apr. 19, 2019) (explaining 
rationale for boycotts and listing over fifty ongoing large-scale consumer boycotts). 
81 See generally GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971). 
82 Id. at 22. 
83 See Devah Pager, Are Firms that Discriminate More Likely to Go Out of Business?, 3 
SOC. SCI. 849, 849-50 (2016); Tim Worstall, Gary Becker Was Right – Markets Deal with 
Racial Discrimination Because It Costs Money, FORBES (Sept. 22, 2016, 8:30 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2016/09/22/gary-becker-was-right-markets-deal-
with-racial-discrimination-because-it-costs-money/#1c2274ba41dc [https://perma.cc/JGU9-
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Nearly fifty years later, the free-market utopia of a nondiscriminatory 
workplace remains illusory. As some have argued, history has proven Becker 
wrong: “[T]he taste for discrimination is very widespread, its cost implications 
become trivial, and the market corrective never operates.”84 In the U.S. context, 
constant emphasis on diversity’s breadth can complicate efforts.85 
Slow and relatively minor improvement in sex diversity empowers critics to 
declare that only the private sector should create, foster, and implement remedies 
for sex inequality.86 Every few years, efforts to get the private sector to step up 
flourish. A few years ago, Sheryl Sandberg’s manifesto, Lean In, urged women 
to engage in a concerted social effort to bring other women up to diversify the 
corporate hierarchy.87 This push to get women to lean in promotes a notion of 
individualized autonomy to general social change. It presumes that if women 
just try harder, they can secure more representation. But such individual efforts 
do not incentivize male elites to yield their droit de seigneur over corporate 
leadership.  
Framing the problem using the passive voice allows critics of state action to 
naturalize discrimination. One advocate of private efforts for equality admitted 
that “There are too few women at the table in America’s corporate boardrooms. 
There are also too few ethnic minorities.”88 The passive voice here erases the 
actors whose choices exclude women. Who is putting too few women on boards? 
Or, who is putting too many men on boards? This we know—it is the nominating 
committees of the boards themselves, which are dominated by men. 
Understanding how male elite power works exposes the limits of purely private 
action to remedy inequality. 
Private sector commitments to further equality have begun to help diminish 
male overrepresentation in corporate leadership, but they cannot on their own 
generate structural transformation.89 Such remedies may ultimately remain just 
that—private—and leave behind wide swaths of the economy. Voluntary 
measures and the activists that propel them—whether within institutional 
 
X579] (applying Becker’s theory to current economic climate and evaluating whether 
evidence proves his theory to be correct). 
84 Drucilla Cornell & William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs of 
Nativism: Economics Freedom and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 595, 
641 (1999). 
85 See Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2018); see also Conley, Broome & 
Krawiec, supra note 59, at 188-89. Kimberly Krawiec and her colleagues performed a study 
on corporate board members and the interviewees confirmed diversity is central but had no 
specifics to share when pressed. Id. This is consistent with the vagueness of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) regulation. 
86 See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 11, at 8. 
87 SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD 11 (2013). 
88 Grundfest, supra note 11, at 1. 
89 Individual effects on change become particularly limited for token representatives. See 
ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 210-12 (2d ed. 1993). 
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shareholders or among nongovernmental organizations—ebb and flow as new 
controversies grab shareholder attention.  
Consciousness-raising efforts like leaning in cannot match the state’s norm-
setting power to effect structural change in firms. After all, firms do not function 
in a vacuum—they do so within the context of law and regulation that gives 
them the life of their legal personhood and the concommitant limited liability 
that only the state can provide.  
III. BEYOND PRIVATE REMEDIES: TOWARD A PUBLIC-PRIVATE SYNERGY 
U.S. quota critics and advocates of state mandates seem to be at an impasse 
over equality remedies. In reality, as the extensive transnational experience with 
quotas demonstrates, effective change only comes through public and private 
efforts working in concert.90 This Part argues that the private efforts touted in 
the U.S. context as the sole remedy for inequality function only in concert with 
public regulation.  
A. How Public Intervention Inspires Private Responses 
Part I described the public efforts for quotas abroad, efforts that prevail in 
most leading economies. That accurate description only told part of the story. 
For public mandates to work, we cannot assume that law, by fiat, will engineer 
social change. The rule of law must hold enough weight over the private sector 
to inspire its compliance. When firms attend to their public obligations, they may 
well rise to meet expectations. 
Figure 2 reformulates Figure 1 by inserting the private sector and its 
interactions with the public. 
 
 
90 This argument extends my earlier work on overcoming the public/private divide with 
regard to quotas. See Rosenblum, supra note 2. In some sense, this effect may reflect Frances 
Olsen’s work decades ago on how the intermingling of public norms that give rise to private 
goals as parties outside the state take advantage of the regulatory regime. See Frances E. 
Olsen, International Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 25 STUD. 
TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 157, 157-59 (1993). 
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Figure 2. The Synergy of Public Quotes and Private Compliance. 
 
 
 
When the state regulates, how do firms respond? While we can speculate what 
firms in California will do, other economies provide guidance as to what to 
expect. 
France actually serves as a good model in some respects to answer this 
question—both it and California produce an annual GDP of around $2.5 
trillion.91 While their regulatory regimes and the broader states in which they 
operate differ—the United States is far more integrated than the European 
Union—comparisons merit attention. 
The short answer is that the private sector’s actions look quite distinct when 
they are taken in response to public norms. When the private sector sees a 
mandate, it responds in many ways, with nuances often overlooked in heated 
debate. 
1. Public-Private Synergies 
The debate over the California quota overlooks how private and public 
interact. The European context proves quite instructive. Public action can 
incentivize private action, as we saw in France. After Mme. Marie-Jo 
Zimmermann proposed the quota there, the “union of bosses,” the Mouvement 
des Entreprises de France (“MEDEF”), quickly prepared its own voluntary quota 
and presented it to Mme. Zimmermann, with a request that she delay or even 
 
91 Kieran Corcoran, California’s Economy Is Now the 5th-Biggest in the World, and Has 
Overtaken the United Kingdom, BUS. INSIDER (May 5, 2018, 7:09 AM), https://www.business 
insider.com/california-economy-ranks-5th-in-the-world-beating-the-uk-2018-5 (describing 
California’s GDP in relation to countries around the world—including France). 
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forego legislation.92 Even though Zimmermann represented the conservative 
Union for a Popular Movement (“UMP”) party, she rejected the effort and 
moved forward with the proposed legislation regardless of their effort.93 What 
this achieved though, is that when the quota became law, the firms leading the 
private sector had already gone through the process of considering what quotas 
would mean and as a result, they were more prepared to implement the 
requirements. 
Fear of legislation may prove nearly as powerful as legislation itself. Credible 
public threats yield private action. This process of public-private interaction 
within France suggests that voluntary quotas may succeed if followed by 
mandatory quotas should compliance lag. Legislators might capitalize on the 
private sector’s aversion to legislation by allowing them to step up their 
inclusion efforts. Without public pressure of any sort it would be hard to imagine 
firms voluntarily stretching their inclusion efforts in this fashion. 
This influence of public over private functions in the opposite direction. 
Pension funds—in particular CalPERS—have been very progressive on the 
questions of gender equity, surely an element that may have influenced 
legislators to move on this quota.94 When the state responds to private efforts 
with creative solutions, it may yield ideal outcomes, in contrast to the solely state 
driven remedies or the opposite, exclusively private remedies.  
To fully understand the effect of public legislation, closer attention to quota 
implementation abroad proves instructive. 
2. Firms’ Potential Reactions: Lessons from France 
How did firms respond to the exogenous requirement of a hard quota? A study 
I conducted in France earlier this decade, at the very moment of their quota’s 
adoption, provides some insight. European firms faced with strict mandates 
often viewed the quota as a chance to renew their corporate governance. Board 
members of leading firms generally conveyed that “compliance with the law is 
 
92 François Lenglet, Medef et Afep Promeuvent la Parité dans les Conseils [Medef and 
Afep Promote Parity in the Boards], LA TRIBUNE (Apr. 19, 2010, 10:19 PM), http://www. 
latribune.fr/journal/edition-du-2004/politique-france/405290/medef-et-afep-promeuvent-la-
paritedans-les-conseils.html [http://perma.cc/VX96-JPYQ]; see Medef et Afep Pomettent Plus 
de Femmes dans les Conseils d’Administration [MEDEF and AFEP Promise More Women 
in Boards of Directors], L’EXPRESS (Apr. 20, 2010, 10:13 AM), http://lexpansion.lexpress.fr/ 
actualite-economique/medef-et-afep-promettent-plus-de-femmes-dans-les-conseils-d-
administration_1339420.html [https://perma.cc/QKX3-7SC8]. 
93 Loi 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative à la représentation équilibrée des femmes et 
des hommes au sein des conseils d’administration et de surveillance et à l’égalité 
professionnelle [Law 2011-103 of January 27, 2011, on the Balanced Representation of 
Women and Men on Board of Directors and Supervisory Boards and Equality Professional], 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 
28, 2011, p. 1680. 
94 See Smith, supra note 9, at 230-31; see also Katz & McIntosh, supra note 9. 
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not for discussion.”95 When referring to non-conformance, this interviewee said, 
“We don’t speak of it, there were some who didn’t like it, but naturally they will 
comply with the law.”96  
Boards’ reactions to the exogenous pressure of a quota could take several 
forms, ranging from engaged compliance to the opposite response of changing 
domicile to avoid enforcement. In between sit many other potential ways to 
comply.97 
The positive story is that while some firms may be tempted to avoid 
compliance, the current trend toward greater inclusion of women may be 
inexorable, as evidenced by the regular gradual increases of women on boards. 
As in France, firms may simply view the quota as an opportunity “to take 
advantage of the renewal of boards to add women as the law requires.”98 
Nominating committees may simply respond to the exogenous requirement as a 
means to “kill two birds with one stone,” and add women who also bring 
experience that their boards need. That experience can be market exposure, 
newer perspectives, or otherwise excluded perspectives.99 The net effect, then, 
of the quota could be to create a virtuous cycle of equality and inclusion. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum sits the most radical response—to change 
the legal structure or the listing of the firm to avoid the mandate,100 was rejected 
as a “more complicated response” to an “easily solved” problem. So 
 
95 Interview with 1M, in Paris, France; Interview with 14F, in Paris, France. The author 
interviewed twenty-four current and former corporate board members from CAC-40 firms—
the CAC-40 being the largest and most actively traded companies listed on France’s stock 
exchange—in 2011. A full transcript, a redacted transcript, and a translated redacted transcript 
are on file with the author. Interviews are referred to by an identification number and M or F 
to indicate sex. 
96 “For large firms, not complying is out of the question. There are some [firms] that don’t 
realize but they will comply naturally.”  Interview with 11M, in Paris, France. 
97 This may be because of the change in posing the questions. The conviction with which 
the author posed the question shifted substantially over the course of the interviews. In the 
beginning it was an entirely sincere question. With this kind of answer as a common response, 
the author began to excuse the question as a particularly “American” one in which the law 
figures as a component of a cost-benefit analysis.  Interview with 27M, in Paris, France. 
98 As one interviewee stated, “[T]he law is the law and so everyone is trying to take 
advantage of the renewal in boards to add women as the law requires.” Interview with 18F, 
in Paris, France. 
99 See generally Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 3. 
100 Even after explaining this, most interviewees found the question close to absurd, as 
conveyed by their tone and sometimes their language, as in the first interview. This reaction 
reflected the corporatist nature of French business culture. Since many French corporations 
have had state ownership in their current or recent past, the concept of contravening a legal 
obligation goes beyond the analytical framework even for top executives. Nationality may 
play a larger role in corporate identity than it does in the United States or in other, more 
“liberal” economies, and the legitimacy of the state’s wherewithal to regulate as it sees fit 
goes unquestioned. The national identity of such firms may overwhelm a near-term profit 
motive. Interview with 18F, supra note 98. 
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corporations will not change their headquarters or delist from the stock exchange 
for a reason such as this. It is a “minor issue to have women on board.” So 
corporations will not “respond to a fly with a hammer.”101  
Here, the comparative data may prove less dispositive: changing domicile is 
far easier in California than in France, which has substantial state involvement 
in major firms and where European incorporation structures remain nascent. By 
contrast, many California firms already game their domicile to skirt regulation. 
Delaware incorporations dominate among large firms, in California as 
elsewhere.102 
Beyond these two stories of virtuous compliance and outright avoidance, sit 
several options to avoid full compliance. First, a board may change its size in 
response to the quota. In France after passage of the quota, board members 
thought that firms would reduce their boards, asking men to leave so that the 
proportion of women would increase. This shift alone could render the firm 
compliant. 
The structure of California’s quota directly incentivizes the opposite reaction. 
Given the already-noted floor of three women, given a perceived challenge of 
finding more women, boards may grow to comply without changing the 
percentage of women on the board. 
Another “get around” involves the less comfortable discussion of stacking 
boards with directors who add little to governance. A board could nominate 
directors simply to comply with the law, but without altering the board’s 
governance. They may seek women expected to play a minor role. In the 
language of some French board members, they nominate a “marionette.” 
This may include a female relative or paramour who would be subject to the 
persuasion of another to maintain control or at least not dilute power, or even 
risk someone who may disrupt a board’s established patterns. Smaller firms, 
some of the interviewees asserted, may prove more likely to comply by naming 
such “marionettes” as they would have less access to pay the elevated salaries 
some board members command in the wake of the quota, and less access to the 
much larger pool of non-French women.103  
 
101 Forum shopping simply may not be well-regarded among corporations whose 
management and customer base is “franco-français.” As one interviewee stated regarding 
changing domicile, “[I]t’s a response that’s much more complicated for a problem that is 
easily solved. So we won’t change domicile or delist from the market because of a reason like 
this. It’s not a sufficient reason. It’s a minor issue to have women on board. We won’t respond 
to a fly with a hammer.” Interview with 19F, in Paris, France. 
102 See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 592-93 (2003); see 
also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering 
the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 568 (2002). 
103 As one interviewee stated “The CAC40 has the means [to find serious candidates] but 
also can place women who are not necessarily retained for their skills. Interview with 2F, in 
Paris, France. An example is LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE’s inclusion of former 
First Lady Bernadette Chirac on their board. One interviewee noted Mme. Chirac’s 
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3. Societal Response to the Quota 
In France, the quota, as with any law, changed the way market actors 
behave.104 There, in itself, the quota incentivized the creation of a deep and broad 
network for women to prepare themselves to join boards, to be placed on boards, 
and to serve successfully on boards.105 Over the course of the implementation 
period between 2011 and 2018, a huge network sprang into action, as all sorts 
of market actors stepped up to serve firms that needed women and women who 
needed training to serve as board members.106 Business schools established 
training programs, small women’s professional groups became far larger 
operations, and the French Women’s Forum—an annual gathering of 
professional women—grew substantially.107 To those who doubted that there 
 
explanation of her joining a board as similar to her saying she was “going to out to buy a 
handbag to give herself a little pleasure, and not as taking on a particular responsibility.” 
Interview with 4F, in Paris, France. Another defended the choice, saying that Mme. Chirac 
could serve as an ambassador for one of France’s most established set of luxury brands. 
Interview with 8F, in Paris, France. 
104 See Karima Bouaiss & Agnes Bricard, FEDERATION FEMMES ADMNISTRATEURS, LES 
FEMMES ADMINISTRATEURS AU SEIN DES CONSEILS D’ADMINISTRATION DES SOCIETES DU SBF 
120 EN 2013 (2014), http://www.federation-femmes-administrateurs.com/wp-content/upload 
s/2014/02/les-femmes-administrateurs-au-sein-des-conseils-dadministration-des-societes-
du-sbf-120-en-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3DS-TMUL]. 
105 This network had the support of French corporate leadership. The Institut Français des 
Administrateurs (“IFA”), along with “the union of bosses,” AFEP/MEDEF, engaged fully in 
the efforts to implement the quota. See Cécile Daumas, Davantage de Femmes à la Table des 
Patrons, LIBERATION (Jan. 20, 2010), https://www.liberation.fr/futurs/2010/01/20/davantage-
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106 There are more than four hundred women’s social networks today in France. Les Réseaux 
Féminins Permettent-Ils aux Femmes de Réussir dans l’Entreprise?, RESSOURCES HUMAINES PAR 
SIA PARTNERS (Dec. 18, 2013), http://rh.sia-partners.com/les-reseaux-feminins-permettent-ils-
aux-femmes-de-reussir-dans-lentreprise [https://perma.cc/ZE9S-JKCW]. For examples of social 
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were enough “qualified” women, the answer came from the marketplace in 
establishing these networks. 
It is true that in the United States today we are witnessing a substantial 
increase in participation of women and efforts toward inclusion. Without 
detracting from those efforts and their successes, private efforts alone cannot 
realize the substantial changes necessary. Public efforts foster private action in 
ways that private action alone may not or cannot achieve. 
CONCLUSION 
After California’s 2013 voluntary quota, California firms in Silicon Valley 
and Hollywood confronted a series of private sector governance crises around 
sex equality and sexual harassment. The failure of California firms to diversify 
their governance began to have major costs. Faced with the outcry around these 
revelations, California adopted the first “hard” corporate board quota in the 
United States.  
Critics condemned the quota’s identity-driven focus. However, as this Essay 
has demonstrated, they overlooked the extensive, largely successful experience 
abroad with quotas. The quota is not ideal. Public efforts need not be as heavy-
handed as those in Europe to inspire greater action on the part of the private 
sector. We must move beyond the unnecessarily dichotomous framing of public 
and private in the U.S. context to imagine better outcomes. 
Beyond the law, firms now have a fiduciary duty to diversify. A decade ago, 
after the demise of Lehman Brothers, commentators asked, “Would the firm 
have disappeared had it been Lehman Sisters?”108 Today we can pose the same 
question about companies caught in the crosshairs of sexual harassment 
controversies. For example, both Harvey Weinstein’s and Steve Wynn’s 
companies faced troubles as a result of sexual harassment.109 Boards with only 
 
Global Meeting, WOMEN’S F. ECON. & SOC’Y (Aug. 3, 2017), http://www.womens-forum.co 
m/news/global-meeting-2017-in-paris. For example, Fédération Femmes Administratuers 
was created after the Copé-Zimmermann law to help women to be ready to work in CAC-40 
administrations. See FEDERATION FEMMES ADMINISTRATUERS, http://www.federation-
femmes-administrateurs.com/ [https://perma.cc/NV52-7JSE] (last visited Apr. 19, 2019). It is 
a network in which experienced women can help non-experienced women in their future 
careers. This federation regroups diverse associations like Association Femmes AAA+, which 
was created in January 2011 to promote women lawyers in director positions of big 
companies; Administration Moderne, created in 1998; and Association des Femmes 
Diplômées d’Expertise Comptable Administrateur, created after the CBQ law to obtain the 
goal of forty percent of women directors in CAC-40 firms. See id. 
108 See Tim Worstall, Of Course the Crisis Would Have Been Different if Lehman Brothers 
Had Been Lehman Sisters, FORBES (Mar. 29, 2014, 8:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/timworstall/2014/03/29/of-course-the-crisis-would-have-been-different-if-lehman-
brothers-had-been-lehman-sisters/. 
109 Yohana Desta, $500 Million Deal Saves Weinstein Company—but Harvey’s Reportedly 
Getting Nothing, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 2, 2018, 12:55 PM), https://www.vanityfair.com/ 
hollywood/2018/03/the-weinstein-company-500-million-deal-harvey-bob; Khalon Richard, 
 
  
2019] CALIFORNIA DREAMING? 1457 
 
men like the Weinstein Company or almost all men, like Wynn Resorts, wallow 
in groupthink.110 Had these firms’ boards included a critical mass of women, one 
wonders whether the methodical process for decisionmaking—including 
perhaps methodical questions around hush payments—might have prevented 
these scandals. 
Quotas now appear necessary to respond to a fundamental market failure in 
corporate leadership. Even after women have matched men for decades as 
graduates of top professional programs, women lag sharply in corporate 
leadership. Firms that stick to all-male or mostly male teams—whether on a 
corporate board or a Senate committee—are simply missing out on the full range 
of talent available. 
Even with its flaws, the quota makes sex equality the core debate in corporate 
governance. While the specific means of this quota may face challenges, the 
process of regulation is an iterative one, and states may respond with more 
carefully targeted remedies for inequality. Regardless of how quotas come into 
the United States, they are sure to move U.S. corporate leadership away from its 
all-male club status. 
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